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COMPARED WHEN? TEACHING INDIAN LAW IN THE
STANDARD CURRICULUM
JAMES M. G RIJALVA*

Dear Prof. Grijalva,
I seem to remember you saying in class one day that everyone
who is going to practice law in North Dakota should take your
Indian Law class because an Indian Law issue will come up. Well
I did not take your advice, and an Indian Law issue has come up.
I hope that you do not mind helping me out now.
-Email message from a former student1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although I did not initially plan to practice Indian law,2 it never occurred to me not to take Indian law courses in law school. As the son of an
Indian Health Services dentist, I lived in and near Indian country for most
of my childhood. When I chose law as a vocation, my early affinity for
Indian country issues led to a college thesis on Alaska Native hunting and
fishing rights, and then to Federal Indian Law, Native Natural Resources,
and related courses in law school. That background set the stage for a private environmental law practice that evolved, somewhat by happenstance,
into an emphasis on Indian country issues and then later to an academic
appointment in related areas.
Outside of Indian law courses, I don’t recall any of my law teachers
commenting on or incorporating Indian law issues into their courses.
Despite my interest in Indian Country, I failed to notice the omission then;
it wasn’t until much later that I began to see the many connections between
*
Director, Tribal Environmental Law Project and Randy H. Lee Associate Professor of Law at
the University of North Dakota. I thank Dr. Rhonda Schwartz for her assistance in researching
this article, and Kara Gansmann and Christene Beaupre for their assistance in editing and citechecking the draft article.
1. My first draft of this article opened with a fictional quote I created to paraphrase the
content of common phone calls I’ve received from former students over twelve years of law teaching. I replaced the fictional quote with this electronic mail message I received the same week as
the Indian law pedagogy conference that is the focus of this symposium. Conversations with other
Indian law teachers at the conference confirmed that many receive similar calls and messages like
the one quoted here.
2. Throughout this article, I use the phrase “Indian law” to refer both to federal Indian law
and the law made by American Indian tribes, sometimes separately referred to as “tribal law.”
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Indian law and other areas of the law. My representation of tribal governments on a host of environmental and natural resource issues implicated
contracts, property, torts, corporate law, bankruptcy, state and federal constitutional law and taxation, as well as civil procedure and professional
responsibility.
When I began teaching full-time in 1994, the connections became even
clearer to me, so I began integrating Indian law issues and cases into my
“other” courses.3 Here on the northern Plains, it seemed obvious to me that
many students would likely confront these issues in practice, yet the enrollments in my Federal Indian Law course were consistently small. One of
my senior faculty colleagues kindly allowed me to appear in her first-year
course in the spring to pitch Indian law to the students, and enrollments
spiked for a time. Later, I assumed responsibility for the Property I and II
course sequence, and converted my one-time, five-minute pitch into a series
of integrated cases and issues.
I did not know then that integration of Indian law issues into other
courses was the origin of the study of Indian law in American law schools.4
The academy has come far since that time; many schools now offer one or
more Indian law courses, and several offer certificates and even LL.M.
degrees in Indian law. But the former student’s email message quoted
above, and numerous phone messages like it, raise the question whether
specialized Indian law courses are the answer to preparing students for
broad general practice. Many students, it seems, are simply unaware of
Indian law and its potential impacts on their future clients. Students who do
realize that the body of Indian law exists often see it as a specialized area
irrelevant to their intended career paths. Neither group tends to enroll in
Indian law courses.
This article explores whether that reality deserves attention, and if so,
how law teachers might approach it. Section II suggests there are several
important pedagogical justifications and goals for Indian law integration.
Section III takes up possible barriers and risks associated with integration,
arguing they are misplaced or surmountable. In section IV, I review student
reactions to an integration exercise in my Property Law course, which
anecdotally support the goals of integration and suggest the risks are
manageable. The article concludes with a plea and suggestions for

3. My initial teaching responsibilities included Federal Indian Law, Administrative Law,
Environmental Law, and Intellectual Property.
4. See Rennard Strickland & Gloria Valencia-Weber, Observations on the Evolution of
Indian Law in the Law Schools, 26 N.M. L. REV. 153, 156-58 (1996) (describing the first appearance of Indian law in legal education in the 1970s by way of “subversive” integration in Property
and then Constitutional Law courses).

2006]

TEACHING INDIAN LAW

699

increased attention to Indian law issues in courses not focused on Indian
law.
II. POSSIBLE PEDAGOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND GOALS
There are any number of possible pedagogical justifications and goals
for integrating Indian law into other courses in the “standard” law school
curriculum. Some of these are amorphous theoretical aspirations, while
others have direct practical applications and outcomes. Their value in any
particular course depends largely on the individual teacher’s course-specific
goals and teaching philosophy. They may also be influenced by the
collective vision of the faculty as to their school’s mission. But, as the
commercial advertising industry might tell us, integrating Indian law offers
something for everyone.
A. SEEKING INTEGRITY IN LEGAL EDUCATION
At perhaps the most general and theoretical level, integrating Indian
law issues throughout the law school curriculum offers an additional
measure of integrity in legal education.5 Indian law is “important in its own
right,”6 and devoting time to its study models intellectual curiosity, one of
our profession’s greatest virtues.7 The continuity of Indian tribes as
sovereigns predating the United States’ federal and state governments alone
justifies attention.8 Especially in states encompassing tribal homelands and
tribal governments with functioning legal systems, I agree it is
“irresponsible [for law schools] to ignore” Indian law issues.9 Indeed,
arguably law schools should recognize an obligation to address the unique
needs of tribes and Indians for legal services.10

5. Failing to address Indian law might be considered a distortion of some doctrines. See
Frank Pommersheim, “Our Federalism” in the Context of Federal Courts and Tribal Courts: An
Open Letter to the Federal Courts’ Teaching and Scholarly Community, 71 U. COLO. L. REV.
123, 124 (2000) [hereinafter Pommersheim, Our Federalism].
6. Cynthia Ford, Integrating Indian Law into a Traditional Civil Procedure Course, 46
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1264 (1996) (quoting Professor Martha Minow, Harvard Law School)
[hereinafter Ford, Integrating Indian Law].
7. Id. at 1244.
8. See Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 4, at 161.
9. Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1264 (quoting Professor Ann Jergens,
William Mitchell Law School).
10. Debra L. Donahue, A Call for Native American Natural Resources in the Law School
Curriculum, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 211, 212 (2004). Judith Resnik suggests
integration of Indian law into federal courts jurisprudence could help address a “belated sense of
obligation to speak about the history of treatment of Indian tribes.” Judith Resnik, Dependent
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 701 (1989).
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That responsibility may be more compelling in the face of continuing
deficiencies in secondary and higher education in the United States. It
seems that very few students arrive at the legal academy with studied
knowledge of the history of U.S.-tribal relations or the contemporary issues
facing native peoples and Indian country, much less the legal issues
implicated.11 One reason for addressing Indian law issues in the legal
curriculum is simply as a modest measure to address that deficiency and
offer some chance for students to become aware at least of the legal
history.12 This may well be the last chance for students to receive any
formal education in that history,13 and we should not let them leave the
academy with such a significant “hole” in their education.14 In addition to
improving students’ historical knowledge, the study of Indian law can
expand students’ skills of analysis.15
B. ENHANCING STUDENTS’ CRITICAL THINKING
One important aspect of the integrity of legal education is the conscious effort to stimulate students’ critical thinking skills. The complexities
and pendulum swings of Indian law contribute an additional means to the
myriad of options for encouraging close and careful reading of judicial
opinions,16 with specific attention to how judges apply and misapply precedents.17 It illustrates graphically how societies structure their legal systems
and rules to serve societal values and choices, and how judges and lawmakers make policy and philosophical choices in applying those rules.18
Critical thinking skills depend on the ability to make comparisons
among alternatives, and Indian law provides a relatively accessible

11. Barbara P. Blumenfeld, Integrating Indian Law into a First Year Legal Writing Course,
37 TULSA L. REV. 503, 504 (2001); Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1255.
12. Kenneth H. Bobroff, Indian Law in Property: Johnson v. M’Intosh and Beyond, 37
TULSA L. REV. 521, 538 (2001).
13. See Cynthia Ford, Including Indian Law in a Traditional Civil Procedure Course: A
Reprise, Five Years Later, 37 TULSA L. REV. 485, 492 (2001) (suggesting the question is not
whether students receive a little or a lot of exposure to Indian law, but whether they receive any at
all) [hereinafter Ford, Five Years Later].
14. Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 506.
15. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, American Indian Law and History: Instructional Mirrors, 44
J. LEGAL ED. 251, 255-56 (1994) (suggesting a historical study of Indian law helps students see
history as a serious scholarly venture offering the possibility of “a deeper analysis”). See
generally Samuel W. Calhoun, The Law and the Little Big Horn: What Beginning Law Students
Can Learn from General Custer, 36 J. LEGAL ED. 403 (1986) (describing a critical thinking
exercise used in the first-year orientation, drawing on historical materials surrounding George
Armstrong Custer’s last misjudgment).
16. Bobroff, supra note 12, at 523.
17. Id. at 529.
18. Id. at 521, 538.
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domestic example of comparative law.19 The preoccupation of American
law and society on individual rights might be brought into focus by “a tribal
viewpoint that values common interests, with individual well-being protected because of a relational context with people and nature.”20 Indigenous
views on human relations to the natural world may shed light on alternative
expectations and regulatory approaches for natural resource development. 21
Differences between western and Indigenous perspectives on the significance of promises made, and the consequences for violating them, throw
contracts principles into specific relief.22 Indigenous approaches to property ownership can help students see the values reflected in western
property law,23 and offer a “rich source for comparative discussion on the
role of gender in property rights.”24
Indian law also offers a compelling window for introducing the larger
conceptions of critical legal analysis such as Legal Realism, Critical Legal
Studies, Critical Race Theory, and Law and Economics perspectives.25
Difficult jurisdictional and jurisprudential problems abound in Indian law. 26
Indian law illustrates graphically how western European customs and
traditions influenced the development of various aspects of Anglo-American law,27 based sometimes on fanciful stereotypes,28 and at other times on
overtly racist assumptions and language.29 In these and other senses, Indian
law provides fertile ground to ask whether the “law’s final justification is in
the good it does or fails to do the society of a given place and time.”30
Implicit in that question is the reality that while law plays a significant
role in the creation and maintenance of productive societies, it is only one
of many important roles. Similarly, the study of law is but one of many

19. Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1243; Bobroff, supra note 12, at 533.
20. Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 4, at 164.
21. Donahue, supra note 10, at 217.
22. See Jack F. Williams, Integrating American Indian Law into the Commercial Law and
Bankruptcy Curriculum, 37 TULSA L. REV. 557, 569 (2001).
23. See, e.g., Stacy L. Leeds, The Burning of Blackacre: A Step Toward Reclaiming Tribal
Property Law, 10-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 494 (2000) (discussing the difference between western and Cherokee notions of lands “held in common”).
24. Bobroff, supra note 12, at 536.
25. Id. at 523.
26. See Pommersheim, Our Federalism, supra note 5, at 126; Resnik, supra note 10, at 67678.
27. Williams, supra note 22, at 558. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE
AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).
28. Bobroff, supra note 12, at 532.
29. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON : THE REHNQUIST
COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005).
30. Donahue, supra note 10, at 219 (quoting ALBERT CAMUS, Reflections on the Guillotine,
in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH: ESSAYS 173 (1961)).
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areas of inquiry contributing to the progress of modern society. An
interdisciplinary approach to the law can help students appreciate these
points, and Indian law offers, if not invites, exploration of numerous other
disciplines. Perhaps most obvious are history and historical analysis, often
overlooked in law school in favor of attention to current rules. Indian law
can’t be fully comprehended apart from its historical context, and taking
such an interdisciplinary view can “challenge students accustomed to
generic law” and provide them with additional analytic tools.31 It may also
provoke inquiry into the relation of professional work and ethics, including
legal representation of Indians and Indian tribes.32 Interdisciplinary inquiries provide valuable opportunities to bring non-law literature into law
school classrooms, increasing student interest33 and broadening their comfort with using materials beyond statutes and cases.34
C. EXPOSING STUDENTS TO THE RELEVANCE OF INDIAN LAW IN A
BROAD SPECTRUM OF PRACTICE AREAS
Teachers who integrate Indian law into their other courses may
confront student questions about the relevance of Indian law to their desired
practice areas and geographic locations.35 Partly owing to the general failure of law school curricula to address Indian issues, law students often do
not know what Indian law is or how it might impact their clients.36 That
fosters “an entrenched belief that Indian law is separate and apart, offering
nothing to the more generalized study of law.”37
But modern law practice across the nation, and especially in the west
and mid-west, undermines those assumptions. Professor Bill Rice has
written:
Experience has shown that “federal Indian law” impacts almost
every conceivable field of law currently studied in the schools of
law in this country. From criminal cases to Wall Street bond issues, from adoptions to intergovernmental relations, from accounting to workers’ compensation, the range of matters in which
31. See generally Valencia-Weber, supra note 15, at 252.
32. Id. at 264-65; S. James Anaya, The Ethics of Doing Federal Indian Law, presented at the
27th Annual Indian Law Conference (Apr. 10-11, 2003).
33. See Calhoun, supra note 15, at 403 (describing high student interest and spirited discussion stemming from the use of historical materials on the question whether George Armstrong
Custer disobeyed his final orders).
34. Bobroff, supra note 12, at 532-33.
35. See, e.g., Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 518.
36. Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1244.
37. Melissa L. Tatum, Foreword to Symposium: Native American Law Essays on Integrating
Indian Law into the Law School Curricula, 37 TULSA L. REV. 481, 482 (2001).
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“Indian law” can become the determining factor is perhaps as infinite as the subjects that may come before the Bar for decision.38
Increasing commercial activity in Indian Country—in manufacturing,
natural resource development, tourism, gaming, and other areas—present
expanding possibilities for contact with Indian law.39
I think it may be an overstatement to suggest “all lawyers must
understand that tribes are sovereigns, with governmental authority over
their territory,”40 but beginning representation with such an understanding
might reduce surprise and heedless litigation. And competent representation for the individuals and business concerns affected require at a minimum lawyers be sufficiently aware of the separate body of Indian law to
know when specialized counsel might be necessary.41 That view is
supported by the recent decisions of the New Mexico and Washington Bar
Examiners to include Indian law within the potential exam topics.42
Integrating Indian law into the general curriculum, especially in firstyear courses, helps sensitize students to seeing Indian law issues in their
other substantive courses.43 It may broaden students’ consideration of
potential litigation fora44 and resolving conflicts of laws questions.45 It may
also encourage students not otherwise so inclined to enroll in courses
focused on Indian law.46

38. G. William Rice, There and Back Again—An Indian Hobbit’s Holiday “Indians Teaching
Indian Law,” 26 N.M. L. REV. 169, 171 (1996).
39. Tatum, supra note 37, at 483; Williams, supra note 22, at 557-58; Donahue, supra note
10, at 212.
40. See Donahue, supra note 10, at 212.
41. Cf. Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1250-51.
42. In 2002, New Mexico added Indian Law to its potential Bar exam subjects, “including
subjects such as federal Indian law, criminal and civil jurisdiction in Indian country and Indian
child welfare act under state and federal law.” See New Mexico Bar Exam, http://www.
nmexam.org/rules/rules203.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2006). In 2007, Washington will include
“Indian Law Jurisdiction” in its potential Bar exam subjects. See Washington State Bar Association, http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/licensing/barexam.htm#9 (follow “What are the test subjects?”
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
43. See Victoria Sutton, American Indian Law—Elucidating Constitutional Law, 37 TULSA
L. REV. 539, 539 (2001); Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 504; Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra
note 6, at 1257.
44. See Ford, Five Years Later, supra note 13, at 494 (noting a pedagogical goal of getting
students to include tribal courts in their thought processes about potential fora).
45. See Wendy Collins Perdue, Conflicts and Dependent Sovereigns: Integrating Indian
Tribes into a Conflicts Course, 27 U. TOL. L REV. 675, 675 (1996).
46. Ford, supra note 6, at 1280.
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D. INCREASING INDIAN STUDENT MATRICULATION AND RETENTION,
AND DECREASING MARGINALIZATION
Despite the prevalence of Indian issues throughout many areas of law,
American Indians have historically been underrepresented in the legal profession. As with other underrepresented groups, the possible reasons are
manifold. One likely explanation is the failure of law schools to make law
resonate with the real world experiences of native students.47 In the early
1970s, no law school covered Indian law in any depth,48 and there were but
a handful of Indian students.49 As some law schools increased their attention to Indian law over the last thirty years,50 the overall enrollment of
native students increased nearly ten-fold.51
Even with these laudable enrollment increases, American Indian and
Alaska Native students still make up less than one percent of the overall
student enrollment in United States law schools.52 So the simple fact is
native students generally find themselves experiencing “personal and
cultural isolation in law school.”53 In some instances, integrating Indian
law issues into those courses might help move the native student from a
sense of “marginality as an ‘outsider’”54 into “enjoy[ing] the status of an
‘insider’ on the problem” through sharing her perspectives with classmates.55 At the very least, integration addresses the rhetorical but poignant
question, “How can a [native] student be expected to take his or her legal
education seriously when his or her identity as it exists in the law is
essentially erased?”56
47. See Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 4, at 160 (suggesting the failure of some
law schools to teach Indian law affects their recruitment and graduation of Indian students).
48. See id. at 158.
49. For the 1971-72 academic year, 142 law schools (out of 147) reported to the ABA
enrollment of 140 American Indian and Alaska Native students. See http://www.abanet.org
/legaled/statistics/minstats.html (follow American Indian or Alaska Native hyperlink) (last visited
Dec. 21, 2006).
50. See Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 4, at 155-59 (describing the evolution of
law schools’ treatment of Indian law).
51. For the 2004-05 academic year, 185 law schools (out of 188) reported to the ABA an
enrollment of 1,106 American Indian and Alaska Native students. See http://www.abanet.org
/legaled/statistics/minstats.html (follow “American Indian or Alaska Native” hyperlink) (last
visited Dec. 21, 2006) [hereinafter ABA American Indian Enrollment].
52. Compare id. with http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/charts/enrollmentdegreesawarded.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2006) (indicating that in the 2004-05 academic year, 148, 169
students attended law school).
53. Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 4, at 164-65.
54. Id. at 165.
55. Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 507-08.
56. Id. at 505. While outside the intended scope of this article, decreasing Indian law
marginalization can also help tribal legal institutions achieve legitimacy in the view of federal
courts. See Pommersheim, supra note 5, at 129 (arguing the marginalization of tribal courts in

2006]
E.

TEACHING INDIAN LAW

705

PREPARING STUDENTS FOR PROFESSIONAL LIVES IN A DIVERSE
WORLD

Beyond the pernicious effects on native students, marginalization of
Indian law also breeds negative consequences for non-native students preparing for practice in a multicultural world. The theoretical aspirations of
intercultural awareness and sensitivity are key practical skills for productive
working relations and successful business dealings between Indians and
non-Indians.57 Mutual appreciation of cultural differences benefits students
in a “social sense,”58 and may offset fears associated with appearances in
unfamiliar courts.59 It could also engender a level of respect not always
displayed by off-reservation attorneys appearing in tribal courts.60
Law schools might be the “primary environments in which the respectful discourse [between Indians and non-Indians] can begin so that the
twenty-first century is a different story than the past.”61 The academy
seems a natural forum to address society’s lack of “Indian law literacy,”
which hinders true democracy in the context of tribal-federal relations,62
and the “continuing struggle to find a principled basis for the relationship
among the federal government, states and Indian tribes.”63
Indian cases provide “vivid insight” into three central jurisprudential
themes: tolerance for subgroups that desire difference and self-governance;
whether differences can be sustained; and whether distinct governance
structures are supported.64 It seems fair to suggest that for a society of
diverse peoples to be productive, it must accept that minorities will have
some power over others.65

federal courts’ textbooks and scholarship makes more likely the continued marginalization of
tribal courts in federal jurisprudence).
57. See Donahue, supra note 10, at 217.
58. Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 508.
59. Valencia-Weber, supra note 15, at 265.
60. Ford Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1260-61 (describing common reports by
tribal judges that off-reservation attorneys often show little respect for tribal courts and judges).
61. Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 4, at 168.
62. Frank Pommersheim, Democracy, Citizenship, and Indian Law Literacy: Some Initial
Thoughts, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 457, 467-69 (1997) [hereinafter Pommersheim, Democracy].
See generally Frank Pommersheim, What Must Be Done to Achieve the Vision of the Twenty-First
Century Tribal Judiciary, 7-WTR KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 8 (1997) [hereinafter Pommersheim,
What Must Be Done].
63. Bobroff, supra note 12, at 538.
64. Resnik, supra note 10, at 702.
65. Valencia-Weber, supra note 15, at 265.
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III. PERCEIVED PEDAGOGICAL BARRIERS AND RISKS
Section II addressed the most global barrier to integrating Indian law
into other courses: whether any need or justification exists for it. Assuming
any particular teacher answers that question in the affirmative, there are still
potentially significant reasons why she might not actualize that conviction.
Some of these could be pretext, others are relatively minor, and some are
true barriers. But, many of these are not unique to Indian law and, I believe, can be addressed sufficiently to convert them from barriers and risks
to challenges and opportunities.
A. SPECIALIZED INDIAN LAW COURSES OBVIATE THE NEED FOR
INTEGRATION
The last thirty years has seen increased attention to Indian law in
American law schools.66 In the early 1970s schools had no Indian law
courses, but a few “subversive” teachers were sneaking Indian law into their
Constitutional Law and Property courses.67
In 1996, Professor Cynthia Ford reported that 42 of 176 ABAaccredited schools (or 24%) offered at least one Indian law course.68 A
dozen or so of those schools offered more than one Indian law course in
specialized fields ranging across environmental law, taxation, natural
resources, tribal government, jurisdiction, tribal law, gaming, human rights,
and the like. In this symposium issue, Professor Gloria Valencia-Weber
and Sherri Nicole Thomas reported that approximately 64 of the Nation’s
193 ABA-accredited schools (or 33%) offer at least one Indian law
course.69
Without question, this recent expansion of law school curricula could
and should fairly be said to serve many of the pedagogical justifications and
goals noted in Section II. But standing alone, specialized Indian law
courses are an incomplete solution, primarily because they do not reach the
vast majority of students.70 None of these courses are required for the Juris

66. See Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 4, at 155-59 (describing the evolution of
law schools’ treatment of Indian law).
67. Id. at 158.
68. Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1252-53 (noting the course was usually the
Federal Indian Law survey course).
69. Gloria Valencia-Weber & Sherri Nicole Thomas, When the State Bar Exam Embraces
Indian Law: Teaching Experiences and Observations, 82 N.D. L. Rev 741, 746-47 (2006).
70. Approximately 76% of law schools offer no Indian law course. Additionally, ValenciaWeber and Thomas noted that some of the schools reporting affirmatively rely on courses like
Legal History or International Law where Indian law in integrated into the material. Id.
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Doctorate degree,71 and only two of the fifty states test Indian Law subjects
on the bar exam.72 Because of deficient educational experiences, students
are either unaware that the body of Indian law exists or perceive it as a
niche field irrelevant to their intended career paths.73
Those barriers are compounded when the required first-year law school
curriculum omits any reference to Indian law. First-year students are arguably more engaged and open to challenging material than upper-class students,74 but if they sense their teachers see no relevance of Indian law to
traditional doctrines, they are likely to skip specialized Indian law courses
in favor of bar courses.75 So, just as relegating ethics to the upper-class
elective Professional Responsibility course suggests limited import,76 specialized Indian law courses can implicitly reinforce the profession’s marginalization of Indian law.77 Professor Jack Williams supports that view by
observing that Indian law courses “provide a convenient excuse to deposit
the rich and vibrant body of tribal law in a place few students travel.”78
B. TEACHERS LACK FAMILIARITY, MATERIALS , OR TIME
There are several practical threshold barriers for law teachers inclined
to integrate Indian law into their traditional courses, but they are neither
unique to Indian law nor particularly troublesome in other contexts. One
concern is that most teachers lack familiarity with Indian law precepts. For
better or worse, the legal academy has generally drawn its teachers from a
limited set of law schools, most of which have historically overlooked
Indian law.79 Often these graduates were hired as teachers without
significant legal practice, or with practices not implicating Indian law.

71. Schools with Certificate programs in Indian law do of course require certain courses
and/or credit hours in specialty Indian law courses.
72. See supra note 42 (referring to Indian law subjects on the New Mexico and Washington
Bar exams).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
74. See Stephen McG. Bundy, Ethics Education in the First Year: An Experiment, 58-AUT
L. & Contemp. Probs. 19, 22 (1996) (citing sources on the “phenomenon of increasing student
disengagement and lack of interest in the second and third year”)
75. Tatum, supra note 37, at 483.
76. Bundy, supra note 74, at 24-25 (describing an interesting effort at Boalt Hall to teach
Professional Responsibility in the first-year to improve students’ “reception” to ethics and
professionalism).
77. Cf. Sutton, supra note 43, at 555 (noting that Bob Woodward’s THE BRETHREN reported
how Chief Justice Burger would punish junior justices by assigning them “peewee” matters like
Indian cases).
78. Williams, supra note 22, at 570.
79. Ford, Integrating Indian Law, supra note 6, at 1256-57. Many federal judges, also from
this same limited pool, admit lacking expertise in the nuances of federal-tribal relations. See
Pommersheim, Our Federalism, supra note 5, at 130.
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Compounding that gap in knowledge is the typical omission or superficial
treatment of Indian cases and issues from legal casebooks and related
materials.80
But it seems fair to assume that most law teachers have not studied or
had substantial practice in every one of the four or five or more substantive
areas in which they teach.81 And, even in areas of familiarity, there are
dozens of issues never confronted before. Part of the law teacher’s awesome responsibility for transmitting knowledge must carry with it an
obligation to expand her or his own knowledge. “[S]erious scholarship is
the duty, the privilege, and the obligation of all who choose to live in the
academic community.”82 There is a wealth of Indian law literature, and law
school and university colleagues can assist in interpreting and putting it in
context,83 as could organizations with vested interests in Indian law
integration.84
Related to these purported barriers is the scarcity of time. Teachers
often lament the adequate time to cover substantive doctrinal issues, much
less tangential topics treated in other courses.85 But the argument proves
too much; regardless of the credit hours, no course can cover all the
substantive issues pertinent to any doctrinal area. Teachers routinely make
conscious and subconscious decisions about whether and to what extent
various topics will be covered. And it is hard to imagine any teacher believing their in-class coverage of any topic is all that is needed to equip
students for actual practice in the area. The best that might be said is that
the course grounded students in the vocabulary and concepts necessary to

80. See Tatum, supra note 37, at 482; Resnik, supra note 10, at 676 n.21 (citing sources
discussing the lack of integration of materials on Indian tribes in Constitutional Law); Ford, supra
note 6, at 1266 (noting Civil Procedure books are “mute” on Indian law). Because of its significance to the origin of real property titles in the United States (and the arguably intriguing comparison to the classic fox case, Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)), several
Property Law books excerpt the foundation Indian law case Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823), although many do not.
81. Cf. Resnik, supra note 10, at 690 (contrasting law teachers’ hesitance to integrate Indian
law into their courses out of a perception that it is “complex, foreign, very different, and thus an
area set aside for experts,” with their willingness to integrate economics, philosophy, political
science, or feminist theory despite not being economists, philosophers, political scientists, or
feminist theorists).
82. Rennard Strickland, Scholarship in the Academic Circus or the Balancing Act at the
Minority Side Show, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 491, 491 (1986).
83. Faulty colloquia can be productive vehicles for Indian law teachers to convey to their
colleagues the fundamental concepts and principles of Indian law.
84. See Tatum, supra note 37, at 484 (describing a 2001 initiative of the Association of
American Law Schools Section on Indigenous Nations and Peoples to collect and distribute
materials designed for law teachers interested in integrating Indian law into their courses).
85. Id.
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educate themselves when confronted with the substantive issues.86 That
more humble goal speaks just as well to the need for addressing students’
Indian law illiteracy,87 for the question whether to integrate Indian law may
implicate whether the students receive some exposure or none at all.88
C. STUDENTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE CONFUSED, FRUSTRATED,
AND ANGERED THAN ENLIGHTENED
Indian law is a complex, anomalous body of law that goes to the heart
of a majority society’s (in)tolerance for difference. Its study is intrinsically
fraught with potential for confusion and emotionalism, which can be perceived as inconsistent with, or a hindrance to, the learning process.
Students may feel “totally overwhelmed” and “utterly confused” when first
confronted with this complex material.89 Because law students seem
obsessed with divining the “right” answers from class materials, they may
express frustration and anxiety over issues lacking clear conclusions or
coherence.90 That result is particularly likely in the face of modern Indian
law’s continuing incoherence.91
But, like other barriers noted above, these challenges apply to most of
what we teach. It seems presumptuous and inconsistent with reality to
assume students are not frequently confused and frustrated by many doctrines (future estates in property and the Rule Against Perpetuities come to
mind) and fact-specific “rules” (e.g., nuisance, the reasonable person, no
disputes of material fact, etc.) regularly taught. And, arguably, confusion is
a necessary predicate for true learning. Rote memorization seems the most
pedestrian of learning methods,92 and it offers nothing for the student who
will unquestionably confront disjointed and unclear legal rules in practice.
Confusion can perhaps hinder the learning process, but learning to handle it
86. Ford, Five Years Later, supra note 13, at 486 n.4 (describing her explanation to students
that many important substantive topics will not be covered in class, but they will learn how to
educate themselves when they encounter such topics).
87. Pommersheim, Democracy, supra note 62, at 469.
88. Ford, Five Years Later, supra note 13, at 492.
89. Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 515-17. Professor Kenneth Bobroff suggests the real
challenge in using Johnson v. M’Intosh in Property Law is choosing among its many potential
themes “so as not to overwhelm beginning law students.” Bobroff, supra note 12, at 523.
90. Ford, Five Years Later, supra note 13, at 497-98 (describing students’ frustration at the
decision in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), which rejected without analysis the
tribal court exhaustion rule of Nat’l Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985), and Iowa
Mut. Ins. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987)).
91. See, e.g., Atkison Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (expressing a need for coherence in the Court’s jurisprudence on the scope of inherent
tribal sovereignty over non-Indians).
92. An insightful pedagogical concept often characterized as a Chinese proverb advises,
“Tell me and I will forget; show me and I will remember; involve me and I will understand.”
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productively seems a legitimate legal education goal. Uncertainty is
inherent in the common law process as it is in life.93 Better to freeze in the
relative safety of the classroom than in the real world when significant
client interests are at stake.
I think the same can be said for the anger and/or shame often following
students’ first confrontations with injustices presented by the assimilationist
goals and flawed ethnocentric assumptions driving federal Indian policies
and court decisions.94 Perhaps law teachers should time their integration to
avoid “problems with potentially strong emotional content [that] get in the
way of [] learning,”95 or otherwise act to ensure students’ “visceral response
[doesn’t] overwhelm intellectual discourse.”96 But, frankly, I think students’ passionate responses to the law are too infrequent and should be
encouraged rather than blunted.97 Teaching the valuable habits of reflection
and self-observation can help students distinguish their “emotional or visceral reaction” from the so-called objective view lawyers assume competent
representation entails,98 without compromising their humanness.
D. INTEGRATION WILL BACKFIRE BY TRIGGERING ADVERSE
STUDENT REACTIONS
In addition to the possible loss of objectivity or distraction from
analytic approaches, potential emotional student reactions may erase or
undermine the believed value of integrating Indian law into other courses.
There is the threshold issue of names;99 some people prefer “Native
American” to “Indian,” and “indigenous” to “tribal.” The difference is

93. Ford, Five Years Later, supra note 13, at 497-98.
94. Valencia-Weber, supra note 15, at 254 (suggesting “multiple historical theories frustrate
students who would prefer one universally accepted truth”). See also Resnik, supra note 10, at
696 (noting that “phrases like ‘allotment,’ ‘discovery,’ and ‘relocation,’ capture events that are
deeply embarrassing to those committed to a vision of a United States founded upon consent and
dedicated to non-discriminatory treatment”).
95. Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 509 (noting a decision not to cover Indian law in first
semester legal writing out of a concern for its complexity).
96. Valencia-Weber, supra note 15, at 254-55 (suggesting teachers must help students avoid
losing focus on the “hard analytic tasks” because of their emotional responses).
97. At this Indian law pedagogy conference, Professor Frank Pommersheim encouraged such
reactions, implying one must be “morally dead” to feel nothing after reading Indian law cases like
Johnson v. M’Intosh, which he simply characterized as “hurtful.”
98. See Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 518.
99. See Sutton, supra note 43, at 539. The issue of names might seem minor, but it carries
significant reminders of earlier days when the federal government arrogantly decided the names
by which certain tribes would be known, as well as the modern relic of non-Indian schools that
use American Indian names and symbols for their athletic teams. See infra text accompanying
notes 104-07.
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largely generational,100 but a teacher’s “wrong” use can offend both native
and non-native students.101
Students may also refuse to engage the material out of a sense that
devoting time in substantive courses to Indian law issues wastes their time
with irrelevant material adequately covered elsewhere.102 Students who
come to law school with some “knowledge” of Indian issues, with its
accompanying biases and judgments, may have a difficult time embracing
the point of any lesson that challenges their beliefs.103 At worst, students
may become defensive and suspect or challenge the teacher’s decision as
motivated by a desire to “indoctrinate” the students into believing as the
teacher does.
That concern can be especially acute in law schools like the University
of North Dakota (UND). UND is located on the vast northern plains of
eastern North Dakota on the western border of Minnesota, once home to
endless tall grass prairie and thousands of indigenous people. Manifest
destiny and supporting federal policies changed the face of the land and its
people. Little remains of the original native prairie or native population.
The enormous extent of tribal territories shrunk to four reservations in
North Dakota, eight in South Dakota, and eleven in Minnesota. Immigration by large numbers of Scandinavians led to an overwhelmingly White
population.
The Law School draws the majority of its students from North Dakota
and northern Minnesota, and so its student body mirrors the region’s
homogenous demographics. Despite the active and continuing efforts of the
Faculty Diversity Committee and others, enrolling students of color,
primarily American Indians, is a constant challenge.

100. I use “Indian” because nearly all of my clients—officials of Indian tribes—use it as a
generic reference to indigenous people. Accord Rice, supra note 38, at 172 n.11. Tribal citizens
of younger generations, from which law schools draw most of their students, tend to prefer
“Native American.”
101. The flip side may also be true. One of my non-native students once objected vociferously to Indian law’s reference to “non-Indians.” She said, “Call me White or call me Caucasian,
but don’t call me a ‘non’ something. I’m not a non-something.”
102. Ford, Five Years Later, supra note 13, at 487-91 (noting student comments on integrating Indian law into first-year Civil Procedure as including some responses that it was a waste
of time). Worse, it is possible, though probably not provable, that students might give lower
marks on course evaluations because the teacher “wasted” time on Indian issues. That result may
be more likely for minority teachers whom students perceive as deviating from “standard
institutional fare.” See Reginald Leamon Robinson, Teaching from the Margins: Race as a
Pedagogical Sub-Text, A Critical Essay, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 151 (1997).
103. See Blumenfeld, supra note 11, at 517-18 (describing her sense that integrating Indian
law in an urban school in Detroit was in some ways more productive than in New Mexico where
students arrived with comparatively more exposure and consequently more entrenched biases and
judgments, making it harder to view the materials objectively).
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Yet, despite UND’s location in Indian country, our students generally
come to us with limited knowledge of the legal and political issues implicating federal Indian law. Like most Americans, they received little or no
formal education on the history of U.S. relations with Indian tribes, or its
legal consequences. They are aware, of course, of the existence of reservations, and may even have a sense that tribes have a governmental power of
sorts over tribal citizens there, though most have no idea tribal sovereignty
might extend to non-Indian activities on reservations. They “know” that the
federal government plays a more active role on reservations than in state
territories, but they typically don’t understand why, or realize its implications for judicial and regulatory jurisdiction, property ownership rights, law
enforcement, or a host of other issues.
Some students are also burdened with long-standing and continuing
exposure to harmful and hurtful stereotypes about Indians. That “knowledge” spans topics like welfare, alcoholism, “special” hunting and fishing
rights, tribal court illegitimacy, tribal governmental corruption, lawlessness,
and others. These are not unique to North Dakota of course, but there is
one significant complicating factor: the University’s athletic teams are
called Fighting Sioux, and their logo is an Indian head.
Since the 1970s, debate has raged on campus and in the community
over whether the name and logo are used “in honor of the first inhabitants
of the region,”104 or demeans, dehumanizes, and objectifies a living
culture.105 This is not the place for a substantive discussion of the controversy,106 but it has created a palpable divide on the campus and in the
community. Harsh words are frequently exchanged, evoking emotions that
range across disinterest, disgust, frustration, anxiety, fear and anger. Indian
students are regularly asked whether they are for or against the name and
logo. Even in the “safe” environment of the classroom, reminders of the
controversy and community tension are reflected in logos adorning T-shirts,
hats, coffee mugs, water bottles, pencils, legal pads, key chains, and
stickers.
Against this backdrop, introducing Indian law and policy in other
courses presents special considerations. Some students are particularly alert
to any suggestion their teachers might try to sway their opinions on the
104. See UND Code of Student Life, available at http://sos.und.edu/csl/vii-4.php. A
common public announcement before sports events at UND asserts “The name and logo were
adopted in the 1930s to honor the rich culture and heritage of the American Indian.”
105. See Building Roads Into Diverse Groups Empowering Students, http://www.und.
nodak.edu/org/bridges/index2.html (follow “Resolutions” hyperlink for Indian tribes and
organizations officially opposed to the name and logo).
106. Speaking on a different subject at this conference, Professor Frank Pommersheim aptly
observed “one person’s tradition is another’s abuse of power.”
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logo. Such students might view discussion of Indian law as logically
irrelevant to “regular” law, suggesting the teacher may have some inappropriate ulterior motive.107 They might buttress that assumption with the
conviction that students who wish to learn about Indian law are free to take
one or more of the several upper-class elective courses focused on the area.
The easiest way to avoid these risks is obviously to make no reference
to Indian law except in courses specifically focused on the topic. But that
approach deprives students on both sides of the issue, and those in between,
of a relevant real world opportunity to apply their critical analysis skills, as
well as the benefits of expanded knowledge discussed in section II above.
Ultimately, like an investor’s tolerance for risk, the decision of whether and
how to integrate Indian law into other courses remains personal to each
teacher.
IV. SOME ACTUAL STUDENT REACTIONS
I entitled section II “possible” justifications and goals and section III
“perceived” barriers and risks because neither the existing literature nor this
article proves the benefits or dangers of integrating Indian law into other
courses. Quite frankly, most of the positive and negative ideas raised here
and elsewhere are based on the same kind of intuitive judgments teachers
regularly make about what works and what does not. If not already obvious
by this point in the article, I believe the risks of integration are non-unique
and outweighed by the potential benefits. And, as I assume is true for other
law teachers with experience or interest in Indian law,108 I can’t help but see
Indian law issues in all my “other” courses. So, I devote a week or more in
Environmental Law to Indian Country issues,109 integrate a number of
Indian law cases in Administrative Law,110 and back when I taught
Intellectual Property, addressed some interesting Indian issues there as

107. Cf. Robinson, supra note 102, at 152 (arguing that white male colleagues and students
see race in every aspect of a minority professor’s teaching).
108. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 22, at 570 (noting that he integrates Indian law into
“virtually all the classes I teach, [including] admiralty, bankruptcy, civil procedure, commercial
law, professional responsibility, law and technology, and taxation.”).
109. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (regulation of
reservation landfill); HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000) (regulation of Indian
country underground injection); Administrator, State of Arizona v. EPA, 151 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir.
1998) (tribal redesignation of air quality); City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir.
1996) (tribal water quality standards imposed on off-reservation discharger).
110. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (discontinuation of health benefits to
disabled Indian children); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (eligibility requirements for
services benefits to off-reservation Indians); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354
F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972) (federal trust responsibility to Indians affecting reasonableness of
agency action).
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well.111 And, of course, in Property Law, I cover the infamous Johnson v.
M’Intosh112 case.
Despite some of the risks of adverse student reactions suggested in
Section II.D, over the years I’ve received a number of positive student
reactions, randomly volunteered. In end-of-course evaluations, however,
students rarely mention my integration of Indian law. That may be due
partly to the fact that my school uses the University’s generic evaluation
forms designed for undergraduate students and not specific to the law
school experience. Seeking direct contemporaneous feedback from students has not been a hallmark of legal education, and the recent trend in
higher education toward assessment of student learning has only just begun
to enter the consciousness of the legal academy.113
Professor Cynthia Ford broke with tradition in 2001 by directly soliciting student reactions to her Indian law integration in first-year Civil
Procedure in preparation for her presentation at the Tulsa conference.114
Her reported results were enlightening and encouraging, and stimulated me
to do something similar in anticipation of this Indian law pedagogy symposium. About two weeks after discussing Johnson v. M’Intosh in Property
this fall, I asked students to spend five minutes in class writing “any
reactions” they had to the case or class discussion, and turn them in to me
anonymously.115 I explained my reason for asking was related to my
upcoming presentation on integrating Indian law into other law school
courses for this symposium.
The non-scientific results were pleasantly surprising (to me) because
they generally supported integration, specifically (and in some cases
explicitly) supported the benefits asserted in section II, and did not implicate the risks in section III (except for confusion and frustration, which I
argued could be seen as positive rather than negative results).116 Of the 71
total responses (out of 80 first-year students), the comments could be
generally categorized as such:
111. See, e.g., Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 1999 WL 375907 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd.
(1999) (trademarked “Redskins” team name as disparaging); Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud
Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087 (1998) (misappropriation of Crazy Horse’s name and likeness).
112. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
113. See generally GREGORY S. MUNRO, OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS
(2000). Most American law schools limit assessment to clinical and legal writing programs. Id. at
16.
114. See Ford, Five Years Later, supra note 13.
115. I thought this approach would be more effective in generating timely anonymous
responses than an email inquiry. One problem I didn’t anticipate was how many “laptop students”
come to class with neither paper nor a writing instrument.
116. Out of a sense of curiosity rather than scientific validity, I did not read the comments
until after drafting sections II and III.
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No. of comments117
46
34
17
13
11
10
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Reaction categories118
Stimulated critical thinking119
Generally positive reactions120
Generated confusion and/or emotional reactions 121
Increased awareness of diversity/other views122
Addressed gaps in historical knowledge123
Should integrate Indian law 124

117. These numbers report the frequency of the various substantive subjects raised in the
comments. Some student responses included more than one substantive subject, and so were
counted more than once.
118. My request of the students was for “any reactions” and did not specify the categories
listed in sections II and III as benefits or risks, so obviously it was my reading of the comments
that destined them for one category or another.
119. Comments attributed to this category specifically mentioned critical thinking, or the
value of comparative approaches, or discussed the logical force, justice, or fairness, of the Court’s
analysis and result. One representative comment said, “I definitely expanding [sic] my logical
thought processes on the subject of property by being introduced to an often hidden subject or
idea.” Another said, “I think its [sic] important to have cases such as these. It allows us to see
what we may have never seen. We can use these cases to contrast what we are learning against
what we know.” Another said, “The case gave a harsh and realistic illustration of our ability to
rationalize and legitimize even the most improper and unfair courses of action. The way the
decision was based on other elitist countries’ policy and methods of claiming/taking land was
more than a reach in my opinion.”
120. Comments attributed to this category specifically noted perceived value in including the
case and discussion, but did not include comments discussing the substantive rationale or result
(which implied stimulation of critical thinking). Representative comments used words like
“interesting,” “useful,” “valuable,” “worthwhile,” and “thanks for including it.”
121. Comments attributed to this category used words like “confused,” “mixed emotions,”
“disgust,” “shame,” “embarrassed,” “frustrated,” and “disturbed” or “disturbing.” One representative comment said “I was shocked at the sentiments toward the tribes. Marshall’s opinion made
it seem like the white inhabitants were doing the tribes a favor by allowing them to remain on the
land with even limited ownership.” (emphasis in original).
122. Comments attributed to this category specifically noted perceived value in considering
other cultures’ views on property possession, being aware of diversity and civil rights concepts,
and addressing marginalization of minority peoples. One representative comment said, “The case
was interesting for the social impact of Supreme Court cases. The case was such a blatant form of
racism to the Indians, yet it was written by some of the brightest legal minds of their time. . . . I
think cases like this put a human aspect of law into play that often isn’t seen.” Another said, “I
was relieved to know that concepts of discrimination, ethnic and racial prejudice in the US legal
system and the exclusive and systematic disempowerment of ‘minority’ groups, particularly
Native Americans, would be addressed in this class. . . . [I]t seems crucial to make a conscious
effort to give a voice to those groups who have been silenced.”
123. Comments attributed to this category specifically admitted filling gaps in the students’
knowledge of the history of U.S.-tribal relations and/or asserted the value of integration in addressing society’s deficient attention to that history. One representative comment said “It has long
been custom [sic] in the US to forget about the treatment of the Indian and talk about how great
American history is and how we need to thank Christopher Columbus. It’s important to get an
‘actual’ education—including all aspects of our history and not just what makes us all better or
feel justified for truly horrible behavior.” Another said “I really appreciated the incorporation of
Johnson v. Macintosh (sp?) into our reading not only from a legal standpoint, but a historical
standpoint. This is somewhat embarrassing to admit, but I have never really understood the
structure of Native American land ownership.” Four other comments used the term “eye-opener”
in referring to the historical aspects of integration.
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Increased integrity of legal education125
Generally negative reactions126
Stimulated interest in taking an Indian law course

Notwithstanding my footnoted caveat about how I categorized the
comments, I was heartened that nearly half reacted positively and over half
spoke of or demonstrated critical thinking. More importantly, the overwhelming number of comments demonstrated some level of self-reflection,
which we all recognize is a critical attribute of effective lawyers, but which
is rarely practiced in doctrinal courses. Interestingly, not one comment
viewed the case as irrelevant to the course or as time wasted. Also interesting to me was the complete absence of references to UND’s Indian-head
logo controversy.127
Of the seventy-one comments, there were only three I labeled as
negative. Even these expressly or impliedly supported the integration exercise. In the spirit of benefits and risks discussed above, I found two of the
three128 negative comments particularly revealing:
I thought the materials presented prior to the Johnson case [on
found property and possession of foxes] were a ‘set-up’ leading us
to have certain reactions to Johnson. Let me explain. We discussed found property, saying the property, in cases where it is lost
or abandoned, goes to the true owner above all others and that wild
property must be dead in the possessor’s hands or mortally
wounded and still being pursued. Then we jumped to possession
of “wild lands” in the Johnson case & everything we’d been taught
124. Comments attributed to this category specifically stated Indian law should be integrated
in other courses, or “to some extent” or “more.” One representative comment said, “Our casebooks should have more Indian law cases.”
125. Comments attributed to this category did not use the word “integrity,” but clearly
implied that not integrating Indian law in courses and casebooks undermined the legitimacy of
their legal education. One representative comment said “W/o [sic] at least some reference to this
type of case or these types of issues, it would leave a major hole in the formation of property and
ownership in the U.S.” Another said “Indian law is an important aspect to our society and should
be a part of a truly well-rounded legal education.”
126. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text for my thoughts on the three comments
attributed to this category.
127. Because the comments were anonymous, I anticipated a handful of logo references,
either positive or negative. Their absence implied students accepted the assignment at face value;
that is, as a legitimate course-related task rather for some ulterior irrelevant purpose. But the
absence of logo references also suggested students may not connect the University’s controversial
use of Indian names and symbols, which surrounds students constantly, with the larger themes
reported in the comments.
128. The third comment I categorized as negative said the discussion focused more on my
perceptions of injustice than on “determining where/why the justice (lack of) or reasoning
occurred in the first place.”
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before told us that land (by that I mean rights to possess ie [sic]—
buy & sell) should belong to the Indians.
I didn’t like the case on Indian Law for many reasons. One is that
your [sic] viewed it with modern eyes instead of for its time saying
it was an embarassment [sic]. Well the Magna Carta is an embarrassment [sic] in modern times but you can’t view it that way.
Also you skimmed over the writing about the fact that the Europeans were not always the aggressors nor were they the first
aggressors. Also you didn’t state that the tribes always fought
each other and in the case of a few tribes, some were even forced
to extinction. You also did not state that we had just won a war
against them for the land and the fact that the Europeans gave
them any right after the bloody war is amazing.
V. CONCLUSION
My empirical, but not scientific, inquiry into student reactions buttresses what many Indian law teachers have believed intuitively for years.
The need for Indian law integration exists in real and practical forms.
Many students lack a basic foundation in the history of the United States’
treatment of indigenous peoples, which hinders their understanding of the
legal principles governing modern day disputes involving Indians and
Indian country. Increased economic development in Indian country means
the nature and extent of those disputes continues to expand.
Integration of Indian law into other law school courses helps address
the currently unmet need in a way and on a scope that one or two specialized Indian law courses cannot. The direct practical benefit increases
lawyer competence and decreases opportunities to commit malpractice in
multiple areas of the law across the Nation, particularly in the many western
and mid-western states with Indian country. A host of other Indian law
integration benefits are more amorphous, but nonetheless are bedrock
aspects of the academy: developing students’ critical thinking, transmitting
accurate and comprehensive knowledge, and providing a supportive
learning environment inclusive of all students.
The barriers and risks sometimes perceived for integration are legitimate, but they are not unique to Indian law nor do they seem particularly
challenging. Some of those risks I think we avoid to the detriment of our
students; complex material is confusing and injustice sanctioned by the rule
of law is frustrating. Do we really want our students to have no emotional
reaction, or should we help them find productive means for coping with
their humanness?
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The practical barrier of teachers’ lack of knowledge and time to
remedy that gap is more fundamental but still surmountable. Indian law
teachers can forward new cases and materials relevant to colleagues teaching other subjects in their schools. They can make time to consult with and
assist those colleagues individually or collectively through faculty colloquia. They can reach colleagues outside their schools with articles in legal
education journals and course materials and thoughts posted to the Internet.
A more formal option was announced in 2001 at the University of
Tulsa conference on integrating Indian law into law school curricula. That
conference featured five professors’ articles on integration in Civil
Procedure, Legal Writing, Property, Constitutional Law and Bankruptcy,
accompanied by course materials and teacher’s manuals to assist other
professors interested in integration.129 The Association of American Law
Schools Section on Indigenous Nations and Peoples initially assumed
responsibility for advertising and distributing this materials bank,130 but that
initiative appears to have faltered. Regardless, it seems fair to say the
materials bank should be significantly expanded, which it could if each (or
most) of those who teach and write on Indian law committed to preparing
just one packet of course materials.131
In the foreword to the law review symposium issue collecting the Tulsa
conference papers, Professor Melissa Tatum expressed a hope that conference would generate additional symposia and not become “a spark that
fizzles.”132 I hope this article and other ideas raised at the 2006 University
of North Dakota conference help fan the flame. In that regard, I found
Professor Gloria Valencia-Weber’s and Sherri Thomas’s presentation on
how Indian law became a bar exam subject in New Mexico particularly
interesting.133 It appears South Dakota may soon follow.134 Other states
containing Indian country and law schools featuring established Indian law
concentrations, like North Dakota, Montana, Wisconsin, Colorado, Arizona,
and Oklahoma, are likely prospects to join the trend. Perhaps more than
any other signal, including Indian law on bar examinations demonstrates the
subject is not a niche field irrelevant to general practitioners.

129. See generally Tatum, supra note 37.
130. Id. at 484.
131. As noted earlier, there are numerous areas of the law implicating Indian law.
Additionally, even for areas with existing materials and writings on integration (like Property or
Constitutional Law), other professors would benefit from a choice of several approaches just as
we are with multiple casebooks in one area.
132. Tatum, supra note 37, at 484.
133. See generally Valencia-Weber & Thomas, supra note 69.
134. Frank Pommersheim reported to conference attendees that South Dakota is close to a
final decision adding Indian law to the topics tested on its bar exam.

